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Abstract Reactive systems are composed of a well defined set of input events that the system reacts with
by executing an associated handler to each event. In concurrent environments, event handlers can interact
with the execution of other programs such as hardware interruptions in preemptive systems, or other instances
of the reactive system in multicore architectures. State of the art rely-guarantee based verification frameworks
only focus on imperative programs, being difficult to capture in the rely and guarantee relations interactions
with possible infinite sequences of event handlers, and the input arguments to event handlers. In this paper, we
propose the formalisation in Isabelle/HOL of an event-based rely-guarantee approach for concurrent reactive
systems. We develop a pi-Core language which incorporates a concurrent imperative and system specification
language by “events”, and we build a rely-guarantee proof system for pi-Core and prove its soundness. Our
approach can deal with multicore and interruptible concurrency. We use two case studies to show this: an
interruptible controller for stepper motors and an ARINC 653 multicore kernel, and prove the functional
correctness and preservation of invariants of them in Isabelle/HOL.
Keywords Compositional reasoning, Rely-guarantee, Concurrent system, Isabelle/HOL, Multicore operating
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1 Introduction
Nowadays high-assurance systems are often designed as concurrent reactive systems [2]. One of their key
roles is how they behave in their computing environment, i.e., the sequence of commands the system
executes under an input event. We call this behaviour reaction services. Examples of such systems are
operating systems (OS), control systems, and communication systems. In this kind of system, how and
when environment interactions happen are key aspects of their specification.
The rely-guarantee technique [7,12,22] represents a fundamental approach to compositional reasoning of
concurrent programs with shared variables. However, concurrent languages used in existing rely-guarantee
methods (e.g. [15, 19, 22]) do not provide a straightforward way to specify and verify the temporal aspect
of reactive systems: the how and when. For instance, if we consider calls to the services offered by an
operating system as input events, we can provide the specification handler for each service and model the
OS handler as a case covering all the services; but this complicates the guarantee relation. Also, input
arguments may be part of the state and sometimes they must not change during the execution of the
* Corresponding author (email: zhaoyw@buaa.edu.cn)
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
07
85
5v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  1
8 O
ct 
20
18
Yongwang Zhao, et al. Journal 2
event. Therefore, the relations must reflect this condition. Nevertheless, in a language not considering
events, when having sequential composition of events it is not straightforward to state in the rely and
guarantee that an argument does not change during the execution of a event. Then, the specification and
verification for such systems become more difficult when not having a proper framework able to deal with
these features.
Actually, the concept of event has been implicitly applied in formal verification. In seL4 [14], an event
is defined to wrap all system calls of the kernel, while not considering in-kernel concurrency. In the deep
specification approach [9], a finite map is used to represent events of an interface or module. In formal
verification of multicore or preemptive OS kernels [6, 10, 21], rely conditions are defined as invariants
to represent the environment behaviour. These studies apply the rely-guarantee technique for specific
systems, rather than propose a generic framework for concurrent reactive systems. Event-B [1] provides a
refinement-based formal method for system-level modeling and analysis, in which the execution of events
is not in an interleaved manner. In [11], Event-B is extended to mimic rely-guarantee style reasoning for
concurrent programs, but not to provide a rely-guarantee framework for Event-B. Compositional reasoning
about critical properties (e.g., safety and security) for concurrent programs has attracted many research
efforts (e.g., [8, 16, 18]). However, rely-guarantee-based compositional reasoning about them at system
level deserves further study. For instance, noninterference of OS kernels [17] concerns the whole trace of
events rather than the program states.
In this paper, we propose an event-based rely-guarantee reasoning approach for concurrent reactive
systems. The approach supports compositional verification of functional correctness and safety as well as
dealing with multicore concurrency and interruptible concurrency together. We introduce “events” [1, 4]
into the rely-guarantee method to specify and verify reactive services. Developers could focus on specifying
and verifying reactive services. Instead, compositional specification and verification are kindly supported
in our framework. This can offer a flexible rely-guarantee framework for modeling and verification at
system level [13]. We extend the imperative language in [19,22] to specify imperative statements in events.
Other richer imperative languages, such as CSimpl [20], can also be wrapped by events for specification
and verification at implementation level. This work is the first effort to study the rely-guarantee method
for system-level concurrency in the literature.
We focus on multicore concurrency and interruptible concurrency of reactive systems. First, recent
multicore OS kernels such as XtratuM [5] and CertiKOS [10] are shared-variable concurrent reactive
systems. Kernel instances may be executed simultaneously on different cores of a processor sharing the
same memory. Interleaving may happen at arbitrary fine-grained program locations in interrupt handlers.
Second, in interruptable systems, the execution of functions may be interrupted and jumps to the interrupt
handler. During the execution of the handler, the function is blocked at the break point. Upon return
from the handler, the system state could be substantially changed.
In detail, the technical contributions of this work are as follows.
1. We propose an event-based language – pi-Core, which incorporates concurrent programming and
system specification languages. We define a modular composition and a parallel composition of
events as well as semantics of non-deterministic occurrence and interleaving of events. (Section 2)
2. We build a rely-guarantee proof system for pi-Core and prove its soundness. We provide rules to
prove properties with coarse and fine granularity. We can prove functional partial correctness of
systems by rely-guarantee conditions of each event providing coarse granularity of properties, i.e.
granularity at event level. We provide a compositional reasoning approach for safety properties
defined as invariants providing fine granularity, i.e., granularity at internal steps of events. Invariant
proof of systems can be discharged by local proof on each event. (Section 3)
3. We develop two case studies: an interruptible controller for stepper motors and inter-partition
communication (IPC) of ARINC 653 [3] multicore kernels. We prove the functional correctness and
preservation of invariants of them. (Section 4)
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Program: Event:
P ::= Basic f | P1; ;P2 | Cond b P1 P2
|While b P | Await b P | Nondt r | ⊥
E ::= Event α (Basic Event)
| bP c (Inner of Event)
Event System: Parallel Event System:
S ::= {E0, ..., En} (Event Set)
| E ⊕ S (Event Sequence) PS ::= K → S
Figure 1 Abstract Syntax of pi-Core
4. We develop the pi-Core language and the two case studies in Isabelle/HOL using ≈ 13,000 lines
of new specification and proof based on those in [19]. The Isabelle sources are available at https:
//lvpgroup.github.io/picore doc/.
2 The pi-Core Language
This section introduces the pi-Core language including its abstract syntax, operational semantics, and
computations. We also create a concrete syntax for pi-Core, which is illustrated in our case studies.
2.1 Abstract Syntax
The abstract syntax of pi-Core is shown in Fig. 1. The syntax of programs representing the body of an
event extends the syntax in [19,22] with the Nondt r command, which models nondeterminism through a
state relation r. The Await b P command executes the body P atomically whenever the boolean condition
b holds. In the case study of multicore OS kernels, we use this command to model the synchronized access
to shared resources from multiple partitions. As illustrated in the case study of interruptible controller,
multi-level interrupts can also be modeled by this command via an interrupts stack. Other commands of
programs are standard.
Reaction services are modeled as events which are parameterized programs with a guard condition. The
parameters indicate how a reaction service is triggered. They are the context when starting the execution
of reaction services and decided by application programs, such as the parameters of an invocation to a
system call. The guard condition, e.g. the interrupt flag in x86 is enabled, indicates when a reaction
service can be triggered. The syntax for events distinguishes non-triggered events Event α, called basic
event, from triggered events bP c that are being executed. A basic event Event α is a tuple `× (g × P )
where ` defines the name, g the guard condition, and P the body of the event. Event (l, g, P ) is triggered
when g holds in the current state. Then, its body begins to be executed and the event is substituted by
bP c. We implement the parameterization of events in concrete syntax of pi-Core.
We define two categories of event composition in this paper: modular and parallel composition. An
event system is a modular composition of events representing the behaviour of a single-processing system.
It has two forms that we call event sequence and event set. The execution of an event set consists of a
continuous evaluation of the guards of the events in the set. When there is an event Event (l, g, P ) in the
set where g holds in the current state, the event is triggered and its body P executed. After P finishes,
the evaluation of the guards starts again looking for the next event to be executed. The event sequence
models the sequential execution of events. In an event sequence (Event α)⊕S, when the guard condition
of α holds in the current state, Event α is triggered and the event sequence transits to bP c ⊕ S, with
bP c being the body of α. The event sequence behaves as the event system S when the execution of P
finishes. This form of event sequences is able to specify the initialization of an event system. A concurrent
reactive system is modeled by a parallel composition of event systems with shared states. It is a function
from K to event systems, where K indicates the identifiers of event systems. This design is more general
and could be applied to track executing events. For instance, we use K to represent the core identifier in
multicore systems.
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[Basic]
−
(Basic f, s)
c−→ (⊥, f s)
[Seq1]
(P1, s)
c−→ (⊥, s′)
(P1; ;P2, s)
c−→ (P2, s′)
[Seq2]
(P1, s)
c−→ (P ′1, s′) P ′1 6=⊥
(P1; ;P2, s)
c−→ (P ′1; ;P2, s′)
[CondF]
s /∈ b
(Cond b P1 P2, s)
c−→ (P2, s)
[CondT]
s ∈ b
(Cond b P1 P2, s)
c−→ (P1, s)
[WhileT]
s ∈ b
(While b P, s)
c−→ (P ; ; (While b P ), s)
[WhileF]
s /∈ b
(While b P ), s)
c−→ (⊥, s)
[Nondt]
(s, s′) ∈ r
(Nondt r, s)
c−→ (⊥, s′)
[Await]
s ∈ b (P, s) c
∗
−→ (⊥, s′)
(Await b P, s)
c−→ (⊥, s′)
[InnerEvt]
(P, s)
c−→ (P ′, s′)
(bP c, s, x) c@k−→ (bP ′c, s′, x)
[BasicEvt]
P = body(α) s ∈ guard(α) x′ = x(k 7→ Event α)
(Event α, s, x)
Event α@κ−→ (bP c, s, x′)
[EvtSet]
i 6 n (Ei, s, x) Ei@κ−→ (E ′i , s, x′)
({E0, ..., En}, s, x) Ei@κ−→ (E ′i ⊕ {E0, ..., En}, s, x′)
[EvtSeq1]
(E, s, x) t@κ−→ (E ′, s′, x′) E ′ 6= b⊥c
(E ⊕ S, s, x) t@κ−→ (E ′ ⊕ S, s′, x′)
[EvtSeq2]
(E, s, x) t@κ−→ (b⊥c, s′, x′)
(E ⊕ S, s, x) t@κ−→ (S, s′, x′)
[Par]
(PS(κ), s, x) t@κ−→ (S′, s′, x′) PS′ = PS(κ 7→ S′)
(PS, s, x) t@κ−→ (PS′, s′, x′)
Figure 2 Operational Semantics of pi-Core
2.2 Operational Semantics
The semantics of pi-Core is defined via transition rules between configurations. We define a configuration
C in pi-Core as a triple (], s, x) where ] is a specification, s is a state, and x : K → E is an event context.
The event context indicates which event is currently executed in an event system k.
A system can perform two kinds of transitions: action transitions and environment transitions. The
former are performed by the system itself at a parallel event system or an event system; the latter by
an arbitrary environment in a parallel event system, or by an event system kj when computing an event
system ki with j 6= i. Transition rules for actions in events, event systems, and parallel event systems have
the form (]1, s1, x1)
δ−→ (]2, s2, x2), where δ = t@κ is a label indicating the kind of transition. Here t can
be a constant to indicate a program action or an occurrence of an event E . @κ means that the action δ
occurs in event system κ. Environment transition rules have the form (], s, x)
e−→ (], s′, x′). Intuitively, a
transition made by the environment may change the state and the event context but not the specification.
Transition rules of pi-Core are shown in Fig. 2. Transition rules of programs follow the traditional form
of (P1, s1)
c−→ (P2, s2), since the execution of programs does not change the event context. c
∗
−→ in the
Await rule is the reflexive transitive closure of
c−→. Nondt transits from a state s to state s′ if (s, s′) ∈ r
and it blocks otherwise. Other transition rules of programs are standard.
The execution of bP c mimics program P . The BasicEvt rule shows the occurrence of an event when
its guard is true in the current state. It updates the specification and context of the current state to the
program bounded to the triggered event and the event itself, respectively. The EvtSet, EvtSeq1, and
EvtSeq2 rules specify the occurrence and execution of events in an event set. After the execution of the
event, the event system behaves as the original event set.
The Par rule shows that the execution of a parallel event system is modeled by a non-deterministic
interleaving of event systems. PS(κ 7→ S ′) updates the function PS using S ′ to replace the mapping of κ.
The parallel composition of event systems is fine-grained since small steps in events are interleaved in the
semantics of pi-Core. This design relaxes the atomicity of events in other approaches (e.g., Event-B [1]).
Our framework in this paper tackles with partial correctness and therefore we are assuming program
termination. In the semantics, state transformation of Basic f is atomic as well as guard evaluation
of Cond, While, and Await statements. It is reasonable for specification for two reasons. First,
complicated guard conditions in programming languages may be decomposed and specified by introducing
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local variables in pi-Core. Second, shared variables in concurrent programs, such as multicore OS kernels,
are usually controlled by mutex.
2.3 Computation
A computation of pi-Core is a sequence of transitions. We define the set of computations of parallel event
systems as Ψ(PS), which is a set of lists of configurations inductively defined as follows. The singleton
list is always a computation. Two consecutive configurations are part of a computation if they are the
initial and final configurations of an environment or action transition. The operator # in e#l represents
the insertion of element e in list l.
One : [(PS, s, x)] ∈ Ψ(PS)
Env : (PS, s1, x1)#cs ∈ Ψ(PS) =⇒ (PS, s2, x2)#(PS, s1, x1)#cs ∈ Ψ(PS)
Act : (PS2, s2, x2) δ−→ (PS1, s1, x1) ∧ (PS1, s1, x1)#cs ∈ Ψ(PS) =⇒ (PS2, s2, x2)#(PS1, s1, x1)#cs ∈ Ψ(PS)
The computations of programs, events, and event systems are defined in a similar way. We use Ψ(PS)
to denote the set of computations of a parallel event system PS. The function Ψ(PS, s, x) denotes the
computations of PS executing from an initial state s and event context x. The computations of programs,
events, and event systems are also denoted as the Ψ function. We say that a parallel event system PS is
a closed system when there is no environment transition in computations of PS.
3 Compositional Verification of Functional Correctness and Safety
For the purpose of compositional reasoning, we propose a rely-guarantee proof system for pi-Core in this
section. We first introduce the rely-guarantee specification and its validity. Then, we present a set of
proof rules and their soundness for compositionality, and compositional reasoning about safety properties.
Formal specifications and proofs in existing rely-guarantee methods only consider the state of programs
and they focus on traditional imperative sequential languages. At event-system level, events are basic
components for the specification and compositional reasoning is conducted using the rely-guarantee
conditions of events. This decomposition allows us to ease the specification in the rely and the guarantee
of local variables to events, as well as the reasoning on sequences of events and properties involving local
variables. We consider the verification of two different kinds of properties in the rely-guarantee proof
system for reactive systems: pre- and post-conditions of events and invariants. We use the former for
the verification of functional correctness, whilst we use the latter on the verification of safety properties
concerning the internal steps of events. For instance, in the case of the interruptible controller, a safety
property is that collisions must not happen even during internal steps of the forward and backward
system calls. Other critical properties can also be defined considering the execution trace of events, e.g.
information-flow security [16,18].
3.1 Rely-Guarantee Specification
A rely-guarantee specification for a system is a quadruple RGCond = 〈pre,R,G, pst〉, where pre is the
pre-condition, R is the rely condition, G is the guarantee condition, and pst is the post-condition. The
assumption and commitment functions are denoted by A and C respectively. For each computation
$ ∈ Ψ(PS), we use $i to denote the configuration at index i. For convenience, we use $ to denote
computations of programs, events, and event systems. ]$i , s$i , and x$i represent the elements of
$i = (], s, x).
A(pre,R) ≡ {$ | s$0 ∈ pre ∧ (∀i < len($)− 1. ($i e−→ $i+1) −→ (s$i , s$i+1 ) ∈ R)}
C(G, pst) ≡ {$ | (∀i < len($)− 1. ($i δ−→ $i+1) −→ (s$i , s$i+1 ) ∈ G) ∧ (]last($) =⊥−→ s$n ∈ pst)}
We define the validity of a rely-guarantee specification 〈pre,R,G, pst〉 in a parallel event system as
follows.
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[Basic]
pre ⊆ {s | f(s) ∈ pst}
{(s, s′) | s ∈ pre ∧ s′ = f(s)} ∈ G
stable(pre,R) stable(pst, R)
` (Basic f) sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[Cond]
` P1 sat 〈pre ∩ b, R,G, pst〉
` P2 sat 〈pre ∩ −b, R,G, pst〉
stable(pre,R) ∀s. (s, s) ∈ G
` (Cond b P1 P2) sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[Seq]
` P sat 〈pre,R,G,m〉
` Q sat 〈m,R,G, pst〉
` (P ; ;Q) sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[While]
` P sat 〈pre ∩ b, R,G, pre〉 pre ∩ −b ⊆ pst
stable(pre,R) stable(pst, R) ∀s. (s, s) ∈ G
` (While b P ) sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[Await]
∀V. ` P sat 〈pre ∩ b ∩ {V }, Id, UNIV, {s | (V, s) ∈ G} ∩ pst〉
stable(pre,R) stable(pst, R)
` (Await b P ) sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[Nondt]
pre ⊆ {s | (∀s′. (s, s′) ∈ r −→ s′ ∈ pst) ∧ (∃s′. (s, s′) ∈ r)}
{(s, s′) | s ∈ pre ∧ (s, s′) ∈ r} ⊆ G stable(pre,R) stable(pst, R)
` (Nondt r) sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[Conseq]
pre ⊆ pre′ R ⊆ R′ G′ ⊆ G pst′ ⊆ pst
` ] sat 〈pre′, R′, G′, pst′〉
` ] sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[BasicEvt]
` body(α) sat 〈pre ∩ guard(α), R,G, pst〉
stable(pre,R) ∀s. (s, s) ∈ G
` Event α sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[Inner]
` P sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
` (bP c) sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[EvtSeq]
` E sat 〈pre,R,G,m〉
` S sat 〈m,R,G, pst〉
` (E ⊕ S) sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[EvtSet]
∀i 6 n. ` Ei sat 〈presi, Rsi, Gsi, pstsi〉
stable(pre,R) ∀i, j 6 n. pstsi ⊆ presj
∀i 6 n. pre ⊆ presi ∀i 6 n. pstsi ⊆ pst
∀i 6 n. R ⊆ Rsi ∀i 6 n. Gsi ⊆ G ∀s. (s, s) ∈ G
` ({E0, ..., En}) sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[Par]
∀κ. ` PS(κ) sat 〈presκ, Rsκ, Gsκ, pstsκ〉
∀κ. pre ⊆ presκ ∀κ. pstsκ ⊆ pst
∀κ. Gsκ ⊆ G ∀κ. R ⊆ Rsκ
∀κ, κ′. κ 6= κ′ −→ Gsκ ⊆ Rsκ′
` PS sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
Figure 3 Rely-guarantee Proof Rules for pi-Core
|= PS sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉 ≡ ∀s, x. Ψ(PS, s, x) ∩A(pre,R) ⊆ C(G, pst)
Intuitively, validity represents that the set of computations starting at configuration (PS, s, x), with
s ∈ pre and any environment transition belonging to the rely relation R, is a subset of the set of
computations where action transitions belongs to the guarantee relation G and where if a system
terminates, then the final states belongs to pst. Validity for programs, events, and event systems are
defined in a similar way.
3.2 Compositional Proof Rules
We present the proof rules in Fig. 3, which gives us a relational proof method for concurrent systems.
UNIV is the universal set. We first define stable(f, g) ≡ ∀x, y. x ∈ f ∧ (x, y) ∈ g −→ y ∈ f . Thus,
stable(pre, rely) means that the pre-condition is stable when the rely condition holds.
For Await b P , by the semantics of the command, the evaluation of the condition b and the execution
of the body P are done atomically. Thus, the state transition of the command must satisfy the guarantee
condition. This is presented in the pre- and post-conditions of P in the assumptions of the Await rule.
We use an universally quantified variable V to relate the state before and after the transformation. The
intermediate state changes during the execution of P must not guarantee anything, thus the guarantee
condition is UNIV . Since P is executed atomically, the environment cannot change the state, i.e. the
rely condition is the identity relation Id. To ensure that both the pre- and post-conditions are preserved
after environment transitions we request stability of pre and pst.
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For Nondt r, any state change in r requires that pst holds immediately after the action transition and
the transition should be in G relation. Before and after the action transition there may be a number of
environment transitions that can modify the state. To ensure that both the pre- and post-conditions
are preserved after environment transitions we request stability of pre and pst. Other proof rules for
programs are standard, and we reuse them from [19].
For an inner of events, it is just a wrapper of a program, and they have the same state and event context
in their computations according to the InnerEvt transition rule in Fig. 2. Therefore, bP c satisfies the
rely-guarantee specification iff the program P satisfies the specification. For a basic event, it satisfies
the rely-guarantee specification, if its body satisfies the rely-guarantee condition with an augmented
pre-condition with the guard condition of the event. Since the occurrence of an event does not change the
state (BasicEvt rule in Fig. 2), we require that ∀s. (s, s) ∈ G, i.e. Id ⊆ G. As illustrated in our case
studies, it is reasonable since the Id set is usually a subset of the rely condition of other event systems.
Moreover, there may be a number of environment transitions before the event occurs. stable(pre,R)
ensures that pre holds during the environment transitions.
Regarding the proof rules for event systems, sequential composition of events is modeled by rule
EvtSeq, which is similar to the rule for sequential statement. In order to prove that an event set
satisfies its rely-guarantee specification, we have to prove eight premises (EvtSet rule in Fig. 3). It is
necessary that each event together with its specification is derivable in the system (Premise 1). Since
the event set behaves as itself after an event finishes, then the post-condition of each event should imply
the pre-condition of each event (Premise 2), and the pre-condition for the event set has to imply the
pre-conditions of all events (Premise 3). An environment transition for event i corresponds to a transition
from the environment of the event set (Premise 4). The guarantee condition Gsi of each event must be in
the guarantee condition of the event set, since an action transition of the event set is performed by one of
its events (Premise 5). The post-condition of each event must be in the overall post-condition (Premise 6).
The last two refer to stability of the pre-condition and identity of the guarantee relation.
The Conseq rule can be applied to programs, events, and event systems, where the specification is
denoted as ], allowing us to strengthen the assumptions and weaken the commitments.
We now introduce the proof rule Par for parallel composition of event systems. In order to prove that
a concurrent reactive system satisfies its rely-guarantee specification, we have to prove six premises (Par
rule in Fig. 3). A concurrent system in pi-Core is modeled as a function from K to event systems. It is
necessary that each event system PS(κ) satisfies its specification 〈presκ, Rsκ, Gsκ, pstsκ〉 (Premise 1).
The pre-condition for the parallel composition imply all the event system’s pre-conditions (Premise 2).
The overall post-condition must be a logical consequence of all post-conditions of event systems (Premise
3). Since an action transition of the concurrent system is performed by one of its event system, the
guarantee condition Gsκ of each event system must be a subset of the overall guarantee condition G
(Premise 4). An environment transition Rsκ for the event system κ corresponds to a transition from the
overall environment R (Premise 5). An action transition of an event system κ should be defined in the
rely condition of another event system κ′, where κ 6= κ′ (Premise 6).
Besides the proof rule for each language constructor of pi-Core (Fig. 3), we also define a set of auxiliary
proof rules for programs to ease complicated proof of large programs, as shown in Fig. 4. The first two
rules shows the union of pre-conditions and intersection of post-conditions. The UnivPre rule is usefull
for Await b P command, due to the first premise of the Await rule in Fig. 3. The last rule EmptyPre
means that any program P satisfies a rely-guarantee specification with an empty pre-condition. It is
usually applied for conditional statements when the condition is false.
3.3 Soundness of Proof System
Finally, the soundness theorem for ] being a specification of programs, events, event systems, or parallel
event systems, relates specifications proven on the proof system with its validity.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). If ` ] sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉, then |= ] sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉.
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[UnPre]
` P sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
` P sat 〈pre′, R,G, pst〉
` P sat 〈pre ∪ pre′, R,G, pst〉
[IntPost]
` P sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
` P sat 〈pre,R,G, pst′〉
` P sat 〈pre,R,G, pst ∩ pst′〉
[UnivPre]
∀v ∈ pre.
` P sat 〈{v}, R,G, pst〉
` P sat 〈pre,R,G, pst〉
[EmptyPre]
−
` P sat 〈{}, R,G, pst〉
Figure 4 Auxiliary Rely-guarantee Proof Rules for Programs
The soundness of rules for programs is discussed in detail in [22] and we reuse the Isabelle/HOL sources
of [19]. The soundness of auxiliary proof rules for programs are straightforward and proved by induction
on rules of programs constructors. The soundness of rules for events is obvious and proved by the rules
for programs.
To prove soundness of rules for event systems, we first show how to decompose a computation of event
systems into computations of its events. We define an equivalent relation on computations as follows.
Here, we concern the state, event context, and transitions, but not the specification of a configuration.
Definition 1 (Simulation of Computations). A computation $1 is a simulation of $2, denoted as
$1  $2, if len($1) = len($2) and ∀i < len($1) − 1. s$1i = s$2i ∧ x$1i = x$2i ∧ ($1i
δ−→ $1i+1) =
($2i
δ−→ $2i+1).
In order to decompose computations of event systems to those of events, we define serialization of
events based on the simulation of computations.
Definition 2 (Serialization of Events). A computation $ of event systems is a serialization of a set of
events {E1, E2, ..., En}, denoted by $≪ {E1, E2, ..., En}, iff there exist a set of computations $1, ..., $m,
where for 1 6 i 6 m there exists 1 6 k 6 n that $i ∈ ΨE(Ek), such that $  $1#$2#...#$m.
Then, we can decompose a computation of an event system into a set of computation of its events as
follows.
Lemma 1. For any computation $ of an event system S, $≪ evts(S).
The soundness of the EvtSeq rule is proved by two cases. For any computation $ of “E ⊕S”, the first
case is that the execution of event E does not finish in $. In such a case, $≪ {E}. By the first premise
of this rule, we can prove the soundness. In the second case, the execution of event E finishes in $. In such
a case, we have $ = $1#$2, where $1 ≪ {E} and $2 ≪ evts(S). By the two premises of this rule, we
can prove the soundness. The soundness of the EvtSet rule is complicated. From Lemma 1, we have
that for any computation $ of the event set, $  $1#$2#...#$m, for 1 6 i 6 m there exists 1 6 k 6 n
that $i ∈ ΨE(Ek). When $ is in A(pre,R), from ∀i 6 n, j 6 n. pstsi ⊆ presj , ∀i 6 n. pre ⊆ presi,
and ∀i 6 n. R ⊆ Rsi, we have that there is one k for each $i that $i is in A(presk, Rsk). By the
first premise in the EvtSet rule, we have $i is in C(Gsk, pstsk). Finally, with ∀i 6 n. Gsi ⊆ G and
∀i 6 n. pstsi ⊆ pst, we have that $ is in C(G, pst).
To prove the soundness of the PAR rule, we first use conjoin in Definition 3 to decompose a computation
of parallel event systems into computations of its event systems. Computations of a set of event systems
can be combined into a computation of the parallel composition of them, iff they have the same state
and event context sequences, as well as not having the action transition at the same time. The resulting
computation of PS also has the same state and event context sequences. Furthermore, in this computation
a transition is an action transition on core κ if this is the action in the computation of event system κ at the
corresponding position; a transition is an environment transition if this is the case in all computations of
event systems at the corresponding position. By the definition, we have that the semantics is compositional
as shown in Lemma 2. Then, the soundness of the Par rule is proved by a similar way in [19,22].
Definition 3. A computation $ of a parallel event system PS and a set of computations $̂ : K → ΨS
conjoin, denoted by $ ∝ $̂, iff
• ∀κ. len($) = len($̂(κ)).
• ∀κ, j < len($). s$j = s$̂(κ)j ∧ x$j = x$̂(κ)j .
• ∀κ, j < len($). ]$j (κ) = ]$̂(κ)j .
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• for any j < len($)− 1, one of the following two cases holds:
• $j e−→ $j+1, and ∀κ. $̂(κ)j e−→ $̂(κ)j+1.
• $j t@κ1−→ $j+1, $̂(κ1)j t@κ1−→ $̂(κ1)j+1, and ∀κ 6= κ1. $̂(κ)j e−→ $̂(κ)j+1.
Lemma 2. The semantics of pi-Core is compositional, i.e., Ψ(PS, s, x) = {$ | (∃$̂ | (∀κ. $̂(κ) ∈
Ψ(PS(κ), s, x)) ∧$ ∝ $̂)}.
3.4 Safety Verification
This subsection discusses formal verification of safety properties defined as invariants preserved in each
internal transition in an event. We use a set of states Init to describe the possible initial states of a
parallel event system PS, and we say that a set of states I is an invariant of PS with respect to Init
if for each reachable state s from an initial state in Init, s ∈ I. We regard a parallel event system as a
closed system for safety, i.e., it has no environment transition (no envt($)).
A set of states I is an invariant of PS w.r.t. Init, iff
∀s, x,$. s ∈ Init ∧$ ∈ Ψ(PS, s, x) ∧ no envt($) −→ (∀i < len($). s$i ∈ I)
To show that I is an invariant of PS, it suffices to show that (1) I initially holds in Init, and (2)
I is preserved by each transition of PS. First, we prove that each event satisfies its rely-guarantee
specification. Then, by the EvtSet and EvtSeq proof rules in Fig. 3, we can get the rely-guarantee
specification for each event system of PS, i.e., ` PS(κ) sat 〈presκ, Rsκ, Gsκ, pstsκ〉. To show the premise
(2), it suffices to show that (2.1) each action transition of an event preserves the guarantee condition
of the event, and (2.2) the guarantee condition of all events preserves I. To show the premise (2.1), it
suffices to show that rely-guarantee conditions of event systems are compatible, i.e., for any κ, κ′ such
that κ 6= κ′, Gsκ is a subset of Rsκ′ . Moreover, we only consider computations of PS with an initial
state in init and without environment transitions. These premises are those of the Par proof rule by
reduction of ` PS sat 〈Init, {}, UNIV, UNIV 〉. We specify the guarantee and post-conditions as UNIV
to automatically ensure the premises of the Par proof rule, that is for any κ such that Gsκ is a subset of
G and pstsκ is a subset of pst . Therefore, we have the following theorem for invariant verification:
Theorem 2 (Invariant Verification). For any PS, Init, and I, if
• ` PS sat 〈Init, {}, UNIV, UNIV 〉.
• Init ⊆ I.
• The guarantee condition of each event in PS is stable for I, i.e.,
∀ev ∈ evts(PS). stable(I, guar(Γ(ev)))
then I is an invariant of PS w.r.t. Init.
We give the rely-guarantee specification for each event in PS by a function Γ. Γ(ev) is the rely-guarantee
specification of the event ev, and guar(Γ(ev)) is the guarantee condition in its specification.
4 Case Studies
We develop formal specifications as well as their correctness and invariant proof in Isabelle/HOL for the
two case studies. The architectures of them are shown in Fig. 5.
The first case study is a demo of an unmanned vehicle using a stepper motor. The application software
and the controller are deployed on an Arduino development board. The controller provides bigstep system
calls to applications, such as moving 10 meters forward. In the system calls, the controller drives the
stepper motor in microstep mode. Since obstacles may appear at any time and be detected by a radar
during movement of the vehicle, the execution of system calls in the controller has to be interruptible to
avoid collision.
ARINC 653 [3] is the premier safety standard of partitioning OSs targeted at multicore processing
environments and has been complied with by mainstream industrial implementations. A kernel instance
executes on each physical core to manage and schedule the deployed partitions on it. System calls are
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Figure 5 Architectures of Case Studies
invoked by programs in partitions by triggering a syscall interrupt. The scheduling is triggered by a
timer interrupt. A multicore kernel is thus considered as a reactive system to these interrupts. Interrupt
handlers are executed in parallel on processor cores and may access shared resources (e.g., communication
channels). Note that device drivers are deployed in partitions and execute by invoking system calls of
ARINC 653.
We create the concrete syntax of pi-Core in Isabelle/HOL to ease the development of system specification.
In the concrete syntax, the statement “ATOM c END” denotes an atomic program, which is syntactically
“AWAIT True THEN c END”. “Event (l, g, P )” is denoted as “EVENT lWHEN g THEN P END”
. When there is no “WHEN g” part, it means that the guard condition is True. A parameterized event
is defined as “λ(elabel, plist, κ). Event (l, g, P )”, where elabel is an identifid label and plist is a list of
parameters. elable, plist and κ are thus variables in the event declaration of Event (l, g, P ). In the two
case studies, we instantiate the event name l to a tuple (elabel, plist, κ) which is syntactically represented
as “elabel [ plist ] @ κ”.
4.1 Interruptible Controller for Stepper Motor
In the case study, we apply our approach to preemption and multi-level interrupts. We prove functional
correctness and safety properties of an unmanned vehicle with a controller for a stepper motor and a radar
to detect obstacles. The architecture of the case is illustrated in Fig. 5 (a). We assume that the vehicle
can move forward or backward. Thus, we consider two system calls of the controller, i.e. forward(nat
v) and backward(nat v), where v is the distance to move. When the controller received a system call,
it drives the stepper motor in the microstep mode until moving over the distance. When the vehicle is
moving, obstacles may appear and be detected by the radar. To avoid collision, the radar then sends an
IRQ to the controller to interrupt the movement.
We design three concurrent modules: a radar (R), a controller (C), and a programmable interrupt
controller (PIC). The two system calls and the reaction to radar are interrupt handlers. System calls
from applications and detections from radar will send IRQs to the PIC. Then the PIC blocks the current
handler and jumps to a new one. In order to represent the multi-level interrupts, we define a stack to save
the IRQs and use a guarded statement C I p ≡ AWAIT hd stack = C THEN p END to represent
that an internel step p of a handler C can be executed only when the handler is the top element of the
stack, i.e. the currently executing handler. The system state is defined by a car pos variable showing the
current position of the vehicle; an obstacle pos saving the positions of all obstacles detected; and auxiliary
variables i, pos aux, and obst pos aux locally used in the events.
We define a set of events to specify the interrupt handlers for system calls, detected obstacle, and IRQ
to PIC. The event forward is the handler of the system call “forward(nat distance)” shown in Fig. 6 in
black color. The event backward is the handler of the system call “backward(nat distance)”, which is
similar to forward and not presented here. The two handlers drive the stepper motor to move one step
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{| UNIV |}
EVENT forward [Natural v] @ C THEN
{| UNIV |}
C I i := 0;; ∀V. ` i := 0 sat 〈{| hd s´tack = C |} ∩ {V }, Id, UNIV, {s|(V, s) ∈ G} ∩ {| i´ = 0 |}〉
{| i´ = 0 |}
C I pos aux := car pos;; ∀V. ` pos aux := car pos sat 〈{| hd s´tack = C ∧ i´ = 0 |} ∩ {V },
Id, UNIV, {s | (V, s) ∈ G} ∩ {| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ |}〉
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ |}
WHILE i 6= int v ∧ ¬ collide (car pos + 1) obstacle pos DO
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ |} ∩ −{| i 6= int v ∧ ¬collide(car pos+ 1) obstacle pos |} ⊆ Q
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ ∧ i´ 6= int v ∧ ¬collide (´car pos+ 1) o´bstacle pos |}
C I ATOM IF ¬ collide (car pos + 1) obstacle pos THEN
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ ∧ i´ 6= int v ∧ ¬collide (´car pos+ 1) o´bstacle pos ∧ hd s´tack = C |}
car pos := car pos + 1
∀V T. ` car pos := car pos+ 1 sat 〈{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ ∧ i´ 6= int v
∧¬collide (´car pos+ 1) o´bstacle pos ∧ hd s´tack = C |} ∩ {V } ∩ {T},
Id, UNIV, {s | (V, s) ∈ G} ∩ {| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´+ 1 |}〉
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´+ 1 |}
FI END;;
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´+ 1 |}
C I i := i + 1 ∀V. ` i := i+ 1 sat〈{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´+ 1 ∧ hd s´tack = C |} ∩ {V },
Id, UNIV, {s | (V, s) ∈ G} ∩ {| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ |}〉
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ |}
OD;;
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ ∧ (´i = int v ∨ collide (´car pos+ 1) obstacle pos) |}
C I iret ∀V. ` iret sat 〈Q ∩ {| hd s´tack = C |} ∩ {V }, Id, UNIV, {s | (V, s) ∈ G} ∩Q〉
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ ∧ (´i = int v ∨ collide (´pos aux+ i´+ 1) obstacle pos) |}
END
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ ∧ (´i = int v ∨ collide (´pos aux+ i´+ 1) obstacle pos) |}
Figure 6 Definition of Event forward and its Proof Sketch
forward or backward each time until it moves over v steps. During the movement, if the handler finds
that there is an obstacle in the next position, it stops immediately. In the end of the handler, the iret
statement pops the IRQ stack. The event obstacle shown as follows is the handler of IRQs from the radar.
The event will insert the position of the appeared obstacle into obstacle pos. Here, we assume that an
obstacle will not appear at the current position of the vehicle as well as one step before and after the
current position. Otherwise, the vehicle cannot avoid collision in time. The event IRQs simulates the
receiving of IRQs in the PIC. It pushes the new IRQ to the stack. We assume that if an IRQ from one
device is being handled, no IRQ from the same device will come. The two events are shown as follows. In
this case, we permit that events forward (or backward) and obstacle could be preempted by each other.
EVENT obstacle [Integer v] @ R
THEN
R I obst pos aux := obstacle pos;;
R I IF v 6= car pos ∧ v 6= car pos + 1 ∧ v 6= car pos - 1 THEN
obstacle pos := v # obstacle pos
FI;;
R I iret
END
EVENT IRQs [Irq d] @ PIC
THEN
ATOM IF hd stack 6= d THEN
push d
FI
END
END
The system is the parallel composition of the controller, the radar, and the PIC, shown as follows. Since
the events can be triggered with any parameter, we use the union of events w.r.t. the parameters.
Ctrl ≡ (
⋃
v
forward v) ∪ (
⋃
v
backward v) Radar ≡ (
⋃
v
obstacle v) PIC ≡ (
⋃
r
IRQs r)
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The functional correctness of the system is specified and verified by concerning the rely-guarantee
conditions of their events. We define the rely-guarantee conditions of each event. As an example, the
condition of forward is defined as follows. The expression {| φ |} is a concrete syntax for a set of states
satisfying φ. We present the value of a variable x in the state by x´. We present the value of a variable
x in the state before and after a transition by ox and ax respectively. The pre-condition is relaxed to
the universal set {| True |}. The rely condition shows that car pos and the two local variables (i and
pos aux) are not changed by the environment. Moreover, during handling radar IRQs (hd ostack 6= C),
the rely condition includes state changes in the events obstacle and IRQs. In first case, obstacle pos
remains unchanged during stack operation (astack = tlostack ∨ astack = C#ostack) and assignment
of local variables (aobst pos aux = oobstacle pos). In second case, new obstacles may occur and thus
set oobstacle pos ⊆ set aobstacle pos. As we assume that obstacles will not appear at one step forward
the vehicle, the rely condition also requires that collision at acar pos + 1 is the same for before and
after obstacles occurring. If no new obstacles are detected, i.e., the controller is currently running
(hd ostack = C), the environment does not change the variables obstacle pos and obst pos aux. The PIC
may receive new IRQs from the Radar (astack = R#ostack), and then forward is interrupted. The
post-condition defines the correctness of the forward event. It means that the vehicle will be moved i
steps forward. If no obstacle appears among the distance v, then i = v. Otherwise, the vehicle stops
before the obstacle, i.e. collide (´pos aux+ i´+ 1) obstacle pos.
forward RGCondition v ≡ 〈{| True |}, {| acar pos = ocar pos ∧ ai = oi ∧ apos aux = opos aux
∧ (hd ostack 6= C −→ (aobstacle pos = oobstacle pos ∧ (astack = tlostack ∨ astack = C#ostack
∨ aobst pos aux = oobstacle pos)) ∨ (set oobstacle pos ⊆ set aobstacle pos∧
collide (acar pos+ 1) oobstacle pos = collide (acar pos+ 1) aobstacle pos))
∧ (hd ostack = C −→ aobstacle pos = oobstacle pos ∧ astack = R#ostack ∧ oobst pos aux = aobst pos aux) |} ∪ Id,
{| (((ai = 0 ∨ ai = oi+ 1 ∨ astack = tl ostack) ∧ acar pos = ocar pos) ∨ (¬collide (ocar pos+ 1) oobstacle pos
∧ acar pos = ocar pos+ 1)) ∧ hd ostack = C ∧ aobstacle pos = oobstacle pos ∧ oobst pos aux = aobst pos aux |} ∪ Id,
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ ∧ (´i = v ∨ collide (´pos aux+ i´+ 1) obstacle pos) |}〉
Functional correctness of the forward event is proven by induction of rely-guarantee proof rules.
We use R and G to denote the rely and guarantee conditions of forward RGCondition respectively.
Fig. 6 shows the proof sketch of forward satisfies its rely-guarantee condition. In the figure, pre- and
post-conditions of each statement are shown in blue colour, and verification conditions produced by proof
rules in green colour. We omit general proof obligations in rely-guarantee, i.e., stability of pre- and
post-conditions w.r.t. the rely relation, and that rely and guarantee are reflexive. We use a loop invariant
{| c´ar pos = p´os aux+ i´ |} for the WHILE statement. Then, the functional correctness of Ctrl, Radar,
and PIC could be proved using the EvtSet proof rule in Fig. 3. Finally, we define the rely-guarantee
condition of the whole system as 〈UNIV, {}, Gsys, Qsys〉 and prove the correctness using the Par proof
rule. We release the pre-condition to the universal set and consider the system as a closed one, i.e. the
rely condition is an empty set.
We verify a safety property defined as inv ≡ {| ¬collide c´ar pos o´bstacle pos) |} of the system, which
means that the vehicle will not collide with any obstacle at any time. By the functional correctness of the
system and the Conseq proof rule, it is straightforward that ` V ehicleSpec sat 〈{s0}, {}, UNIV, UNIV 〉,
where s0 is the initial state of the system. Then we prove that inv is an invariant of V ehicleSpec using
Theorem 2 by showing that {s0} ⊆ inv and the guarantee condition of each event is stable for inv.
In the case study, we have only one external device, i.e. the radar. It is straightforward to support
multiple devices which could be specified as event systems in pi-Core.
4.2 IPC in ARINC 653 Multicore OS Kernels
This case study concerns multicore concurrency and invariant verification. Since device drivers run in
special partitions, we do not consider multi-level interrupts in the kernel. As shown in Fig. 5 (b), IPC in
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ARINC 653 is conducted via messages on channels configured among partitions. Partitions have access to
channels via ports which are the endpoints of channels. A queuing mode channel has a source port, a
destination port, and a bounded FIFO message queue.
The kernel configuration is split into static and dynamic components in Isabelle. We create a constant
conf to be used in the specification defining static components of the state. In conf , c2s is the mapping
from cores to schedulers and is bijective. p2s is the deployment of partitions to schedulers. p2p indicates
the partition a port belongs to. chsrc and chdest indicate the source port and destination port of a
queuing channel. Finally, chmax defines the maximum capacity of a channel. Our specification is created
based on abstract data types for these elements: Core, Part, QChannel, Port, Message. It means that
we conduct formal verification on arbitrary system configurations rather than a concrete instance.
The dynamic component of the kernel state concerns states of schedulers, channels, and partitions.
The state of a scheduler shows the current partition under execution. The state of a channel keeps the
information of the messages in the FIFO queue. The state of a partition is defined as IDLE, READY or
RUN. We define s0 as the initial state of the system.
record Config = c2s :: Core ⇒ Sched p2s :: Part ⇒ Sched p2p :: Port ⇒ Part
chsrc :: QChannel ⇒ Port chdest :: QChannel ⇒ Port
chmax :: QChannel ⇒ nat
record State = cur :: Sched ⇒ Part option qbuf :: QChannel ⇒ Message list
qbufsize :: QChannel ⇒ nat partst :: Part ⇒ PartMode
We define a set of events to specify the scheduling and communication services. These events are
parametrized by their input parameters and the core identifier κ. The Schedule and Send QMsg events
are shown below. A partition p can be scheduled on processor core κ when p was deployed on κ and
the state of p is not IDLE. The event first sets the state of the currently running partition to READY
and current partition on κ to None. Then it sets p as the current partition and its state to RUN. The
Send QMsg event can happen in the current partition on processor core κ when the source port p is
configured in the current partition. The event will be blocked until the message queue of the operated
channel has available spaces. Then it inserts the message into the tail of the message queue and increases
the size of the queue.
EVENT Schedule [Part p] @ κ
WHEN p2s conf p = c2s conf κ ∧ partst p 6= IDLE
THEN
IF cur((c2s conf) κ) 6= None THEN
ATOM
partst := partst(cur ((c2s conf) κ) := READY);;
cur := cur((c2s conf) κ := None)
END
FI;;
ATOM
cur := cur((c2s conf) κ := Some p);;
partst := partst(p := RUN)
END
END
EVENT Send QMsg [Port p, Msg m] @ κ
WHEN is src port conf p ∧ cur (c2s conf κ) 6= None
∧ port of part conf p (cur (c2s conf κ))
THEN
AWAIT qbufsize (ch sport conf p)
< chmax conf (ch sport conf p)
THEN
qbuf := qbuf (ch sport conf p
:= qbuf (ch sport conf p) @ [m]);;
qbufsize := qbufsize (ch sport conf p
:= qbufsize (ch sport conf p) + 1)
END
END
The parallel event system in pi-Core of multicore kernels is thus defined as follows. Each core deploys
the same event sequence parametrized with a core identifier κ. When starting a kernel instance on each
processor core, we use the event Core Init to initialize the kernel state of each core. Then, the kernel
instance reacts to system calls as defined in Esys κ, which is an event set.
ARINCSpec ≡ λκ. ((Core Init κ)⊕ (Esys κ))
Esys κ ≡ λκ. (
⋃
p
Schedule κ p) ∪ (
⋃
(p,m)
Send QMsg κ p m) ∪ (
⋃
p
Recv Que Msg κ p)
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Table 1 Specification and Proof Statistics
Item Spec. Proof Item Spec. Proof
Language 420 3,000 Controller 260 900
Proof system 250 7,100 ARINC 653 250 700
Aux. Lemma/Invariant - 3,400 Total 1,180 15,100
For the purpose of compositional reasoning based on events, we specify the rely-guarantee conditions of
each event. The conditions of Send QMsg are defined as follows. The event executing on κ relies on the
current partition on κ not being changed by events on other cores. The guarantee condition shows that
internal steps of the event will not change the current partition on any core, the state of any partition, as
well as the message queue and size of other channels. The event also guarantees that if the size is equal to
the number of messages before an internal step, then they are still equal after the step.
Send QMsg RGCondition ≡ 〈{| True |}, {| acur (c2s conf k) = ocur (c2s conf k) |},
{| acur = ocur ∧ apartst = opartst∧
(oqbufsize (ch srcqport conf p) = length (oqbuf (ch srcqport conf p))
−→ aqbufsize (ch srcqport conf p) = length (aqbuf (ch srcqport conf p)))
∧ (∀ c. c 6= ch srcqport conf p −→ aqbuf c = oqbuf c)
∧ (∀ c. c 6= ch srcqport conf p −→ aqbufsize c = oqbufsize c) |}, {| True |}〉
We carry out verification of a system invariant inv. The invariant inv1 means that if a partition p is
the currently executing partition of a scheduler sched, p should be deployed on the scheduler. The second
one means that if a partition p is deployed on a scheduler sched and p is the current partition, the state
of p is RUN. The third one defines that for any queuing channel c, the current size should be the number
of messages in the queue.
inv1 ≡ {| ∀sched p. c´ur sched = Some p −→ sched = (p2s conf) p |}
inv2 ≡ {| ∀sched p. p2s conf p = sched ∧ c´ur sched = Some p −→ p´artst p = RUN |}
inv3 ≡ {| ∀c. q´bufsize c = length (´qbuf c) |} inv ≡ inv1 ∩ inv2 ∩ inv3
We have that {s0} ⊆ inv and that all events specified in ARINCSpec are basic events. Moreover,
we prove that the guarantee condition of each event in ARINCSpec is stable with inv. We have
that ` ARINCSpec sat 〈{s0}, {}, UNIV, UNIV 〉 using these results and by direct application of event
compositionality and events proof rules. According to Theorem 2, we show that inv is an invariant of
ARINCSpec w.r.t {s0}.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We use Isabelle/HOL as the specification and verification system for our work. The proofs are conducted
in the structured proof language Isar in Isabelle. All derivations of our proofs have passed through the
Isabelle proof kernel. The statistics for the effort and size are shown in Table 1, totally ≈ 15,000 lines of
specification and proofs by a total effort of roughly 10 person-months (PM). The part of “Language” in
the table includes definitions and their lemmas of language, semantics, and computation. For invariant
verification, we prove a set of lemmas, which are also reusable for further proofs (e.g. security).
The Isabelle/HOL implementation of pi-Core provides a flexible and extensible framework for concurrent
reactive system. As a next step of our work, we are using pi-Core and its rely-guarantee proof system to
formally verify a concurrent buddy memory allocator of Zephyr RTOS at low-level design.
In future, as an important problem in concurrent systems, formal verification of deadlock freedom in
pi-Core deserves further study. Then, compositional reasoning of noninterference could be done in pi-Core.
For formal development of concurrent reactive systems, event refinement is very necessary for step-wise
refinement.
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